
















The tendency for the power balance about the separation of power to shift roughly to the
administration is seen worldwide. It becomes remarkable under the Trump administration in
America, too. It may be permitted to say that President Trump's performances are very arbitrary





Rather Considering about the Administrative Power of the President and the
Judiciary in the United States of America
― A research of the precedent cases in the federal Supreme Court ―
―連邦最高裁の判例を中心に―
The various difficulty exists to correct president's performances in the democratic process.
Another way to correct is prepared by judiciary in the separation of power system. However, it is
impossible to say that the judicial system functions sufficiently to the administrative power. That is
also clear from the precedent cases in the federal Supreme Court. It would be possible to call the
confusion of judgment of the federal Supreme Court. The purpose of this paper lies in finding a
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